In April 2013, the Haryana government transferred senior IAS
officer Ashok Khemka for the second time in six months, or for the 44th time in
his 22-year career. The use of transfers and postings in States as a means of
harassing officers who are inconvenient because of their professional
independence or because they are perceived to be close to an outgoing chief
minister is a well-known phenomenon. In his first month as the Chief Minister
of Uttar Pradesh, Akhilesh Yadav moved more than 1,000 civil servants to new
positions. Such transfer processes are essentially an indication of the
politicians’ will to control policy implementation and ensure loyalty.
Articles 310 and 311 of the
Constitution make it impossible for
civil servants to be dismissed or demoted by elected representatives. However,
politicians exert control over policy outcomes by reshuffling the bureaucracy
across posts of varying importance. The “Politicisation” of the bureaucracy has become a major public policy issue in
India.
DEMOTIVATING
If Benjamin
Franklin once said nothing in this
world can be said to be certain, except death and taxes, the former Central Vigilance
Commissioner, N. Vittal, has very aptly
proposed “Vittal’s amendment to the Franklin Principle”: For a civil servant, nothing is more certain than death, taxes,
transfers and retirement.
Frequent transfers present a major
problem for governance because civil servants are not allowed to stay in a
position long enough to acquire adequate knowledge of and experience in their
job. Such a policy also prevents civil servants from instituting or sustaining
reforms. It is both demoralising and
demotivating when civil servants are not able to
see the fruits of their efforts. A young officer cannot retain her idealism for
long if, over a period, she suffers adverse consequences because of honesty and
integrity.
Further, due to politicians’ desire to control the bureaucracy, not all important posts are filled with the most skilled
officers. This also results in underinvestment in skill by junior bureaucrats
with career concerns, since investing in loyalty to specific politicians
provides an alternative path to career success.
Concerned over such frequent
transfers, The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said that no
system can deliver if top civil servants are transferred without notice, and
thus favours a minimum security of tenure.
In State
of Maharashtra
v. Omprakash Ghanshyamdas Mudiraj, the Bombay High Court showed its
concern and observed that “cases of transfer
of employees prior to normal period of three years on the complaints of
political parties should be looked into … with close scrutiny.”
IN MAHARASHTRA
Various steps have been taken by the
government as well as the judiciary to curb this menace. The Central government
introduced the Indian Administrative
Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations, 1955 (amended in 2010), that provides for a minimum
tenure for postings for civil servants in all States. So far only 13 States and Union Territories have issued formal
notices under the regulations indicating their acceptance.
Maharashtra is the only State to come
out with a specific law — the “Maharashtra
Government Servants Regulation of Transfer and Prevention of Delay in Discharge
of Official Duties Act, 2005.” It provides for a minimum tenure of three years for all IAS
officers and some State government employees. Any violation of the Act may be referred to the Maharashtra
Administrative Tribunal with appeal lying at the Bombay High Court.
The Administrative Reforms
Commission and Fifth Pay Commission have
also endorsed the idea of a high-powered civil services board both at the
Centre and the States to look into and regulate cases of premature transfers of
civil servants.
The draft Public Services Bill, 2007
stipulates that the Central government should fix a minimum tenure for cadre
posts, which may be filled on the basis of merit, suitability and experience,
with proper norms and guidelines to enforce transfers and postings. It proposes
explicit limits on the political executive’s ability to transfer bureaucrats
before they complete two years of service.
FOR A MINIMUM TENURE
Unfortunately, even after several
major steps, the frequent transfer of civil servants remains a serious problem.
This is because politicians are not interested in making the situation better.
One of the measures of civil service
reform should be to give every senior official a minimum tenure of three to
five years in a post through a new Public Services Act. The senior officer, who
would get a fixed tenure under the new Act, would be strictly accountable for
performance of targets set for him in a memorandum of understanding between him
and the political executive.
Further, a new provision should be
introduced to ensure that no random transfers
are made after 10 years of service and
that the civil servant should be placed in a subject stream for which
s/he has specialised during training.
There is need to balance the
government’s inherent right to transfer a civil servant against the need for
effectiveness and independence in policy implementation and better
institutional and procedural reforms. The best way to achieve this is by
granting those in crucial positions stability of tenure.
(Pradeep S. Mehta is secretary-general, Consumer Unity & Trust Society International.
Tanushree Bhatnagar of CUTS contributed to this article.)
No comments:
Post a Comment