During the last few days there have been many comments
on the report that the government of India was considering a proposal to make
the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (CAG)
a multimember body. The move has been widely seen as a maladroit one. This
article will deal with some of the issues not covered in the comments that have
appeared so far.
If one looks at Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) around the world, one will find both
single-member SAIs (e.g., the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, etc)
and multimember bodies such as Audit Commissions or Courts (France, Germany,
Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc). Both forms seem to be working well.
There seems to have been no general or widespread debate on the form of the SAI.
Single-member or multimember, whichever form a country starts with seems to
stay unchanged. There seems to be hardly any basis for supposing that the SAI
works better in countries with the multimember form than in countries with the
single-member form.
Hypothetically speaking, if in India we had started
with a multimember SAI, we would probably have stayed with it. As it happens,
the U.K., the U.S., Canada, etc, have single-member SAIs, and we adopted that
pattern. One has not heard that there has been dissatisfaction in England or
America with the form of the SAI and a desire to change it. Why then should we
depart from that well-established pattern? It cannot be said that the Indian Audit Department has not been functioning well. It is internationally
well regarded, is a highly respected member of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
(INTOSAI) and its Asian
counterpart, the Asian
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (ASOSAI), and is performing an important role as auditor of several
United Nations bodies. What then is the need for a structural change?
Case of the Election Commission
If the idea of making a change has emerged in India
from the feeling that there has been an “overreach” by the CAG, the critics
should take a look at the subjects of the audit reports of the National
Audit Office in the U.K. and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in the U.S.
Their scope and range are breathtaking.
The important change in the history of the Election
Commission (EC) was its greater
public visibility after T.N. Seshan’s tenure. He made it fully aware of its own strength.
This has nothing to do with its structural form. The EC has continued to
function reasonably well after the change to a three-member body, but quite
possibly, it would have done so even if it had continued as a single-member
body. It is very difficult to say that the conversion into a three-member body
has meant a marked improvement in its functioning. This is largely a question
of the functioning of the individuals constituting the commission. On the other
hand, there have been reports of dissensions within the commission from time to
time. One can at the most make the negative claim that those dissensions, which
must have made the functioning of the commission difficult, did not succeed in
paralysing it. The history of the EC provides no clear answer as to the
comparative merits of a single-member body and a multimember body.
Theoretically it could be argued that a collegiate form
is better, but in practice there seems to be no compelling or urgent reason for
a change. Assuming that there is a case for a collegiate form, that is not the
most urgently needed reform, if it is a reform at all. What is more important
and urgent is the need to respect the CAG as a constitutional functionary (the
most important constitutional functionary according to Dr. Ambedkar); refrain from denigrating it in an unseemly fashion
merely because its reports make the government uncomfortable; accept the
accountability that it enforces as mandated by the Constitution; strengthen its
hands in every way; take its reports seriously and respond with due corrective
action; ensure that the selection of this high functionary is based on proper
criteria and procedures; make the selection transparent and bipartisan; and so
on. To ignore all this and advocate structural change is frivolous if not
disingenuous.
It has been stated that the Shunglu Committee
has recommended it. One wonders whether that committee had any business at all
to recommend structural changes in the CAG’s organisation. Be that as it may,
the fact that Mr. Shunglu made some recommendations is of no great consequence.
(One recalls his controversial reports on IIM Ahmedabad and on the
rehabilitation issue in the Sardar Sarovar Project.) The case for a multimember
SAI needs to be examined carefully. As has been argued above, it is not
established, and is far from being urgent.
It is clear that what lies behind this move is not the
Shunglu Committee’s report but anger with the present CAG and a desire to clip
his wings, just as it was the desire to hamper Seshan’s functioning that led to the conversion of the
single-member Election Commission into a three-member body. This has been
recognised by all, and need not be laboured.
The analogy with the Election Commission is imperfect.
The Constitution provided for the possibility of a multimember Commission, and
left the choice to the government. The EC started as a single-member body and
continued so for many years, and then was made into a multimember body, under
the existing constitutional provisions. There is no parallel enabling
provision in the Constitution under which the CAG can be made into a
multimember body. Such a conversion would require a constitutional amendment.
With a hundred things on its hands, why should the government even think about
undertaking a major constitutional amendment of this kind at this stage? This
in itself is sufficient ground for suspecting the motivations behind this idea.
Further, the danger of initiating fundamental
structural changes in this hoary institution is the opportunity and the
temptation that it would provide to wipe the slate clean and rewrite the CAG’s
charter, downgrading and diminishing the institution. One suspects that that is
not just a “danger” but is in fact the intention. If that suspicion were true,
what a travesty it would be of the noble vision of this institution entertained
by Dr. Ambedkar, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. Radhakrishnan, C.
Rajagopalachari, T.T. Krishnamachari and others.
Questions
Finally, three questions for constitutional experts:
1. It was surely
not through inadvertence or forgetfulness that the Constitution provided an
option of a multimember Election Commission but did not do so in the case of
the CAG. We must presume that this was a deliberate distinction. If so, would
it be right to obliterate that distinction by an amendment?
2. A constitutional
amendment that would convert the single Comptroller and Auditor General of
India into the head of a multimember body (whatever the name) will be a major
structural change. If so, presumably it can only be brought into effect for
future appointments and cannot be made applicable to the present incumbent
appointed under the existing provisions. If so, would the government still be
interested in the amendment?
3. The sections
relating to the CAG are not specifically mentioned in Article 368(2) of the
Constitution which requires ratification of amendments by not less than half
the State legislatures, presumably because the Constitution-makers did not
expect those provisions to be amended. However, would not any constitutional
amendment affecting the institution of the CAG (who is CAG for the States as
well as the Centre) require consultation with the States, even if 368(2) does
not apply?
(Ramaswamy R. Iyer is a former Secretary, Water
Resources, Government of India.)
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